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                                                    Abstract 
 
We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumption 
expenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data.  Fiscal expansions taking place 
when monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times. 
The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may have 
moderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansions 
accompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains but 
their success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade openness 
and the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude of 
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                                                        1. Introduction 
 
The industrialized world suffered over the last few years a number of large negative shocks, 
initially driven by sharp declines in house and stock prices and by a tightening of credit and 
financial conditions. The collapse in output and the increase in unemployment produced a 
loss of confidence that considerably intensified the recessionary pressures. Policy 
institutions responded with measures that dealt with the solvency of financial institutions. 
Central banks, on the other hand, reduced interest rates to unprecedented low levels to 
support aggregate demand and used non-conventional quantitative or credit easing 
measures to reduce risk premia and to provide liquidity to the financial sector. Despite all 
efforts, credit remained tight and aggregate demand weakened rapidly. There were 
important spillovers from industrialized economies to less developed ones increasing the 
concern that the world economy might be moving into a deep and prolonged recession. 
 
Given that nominal interest rates approached or hit the zero lower bound and that the room 
for maneuvering credit was limited by the inability of the banking system to properly 
function, the scope for further monetary stimulus was limited and attention turned to fiscal 
policy. At the beginning of 2009, governments around the world announced major two 
years stimulus packages to sustain employment and growth. The packages were 
extraordinary in size (reaching up to 2 percent of national GDP) and in breath. The U.S. 
Congress, for example, approved 787 billion dollars of additional spending, transfers and 
tax reductions with the 2009 American Recovery and  Reinvestment Act; the European 
Union initiated the European Economic Recovery Plan, while national governments 
announced their own plans, see e.g. the ‘’ Pacchetto Fiscale’’ in Italy, the ‘’Plan E’’ in 
Spain, the ‘’Plan de Relance’’ in France, the ‘’Konjunkurpaket I &II’’ in Germany and the 
‘’Pre-Budget Report’’ in the UK. The legislation raised old questions concerning the 
effectiveness of temporary expenditure expansions in lessening the depth and duration of 
the recession, but also new ones, regarding the preferred mix of fiscal actions. 
 
The expansionary impulses were considerably reduced during 2010 in Europe when the 
sovereign debt crisis, following the adjustments needed to bring fiscal solvency to Greece 
and Ireland, questioned the sustainability of the debt that would accumulate with the 
planned expenditure packages. In the U.S., instead, additional expenditures for 
infrastructures and credits for the automobile and the housing industries were legislated but 
concerns about the magnitude of the debt emerged. Beside the long-run sustainability of 
deteriorating fiscal positions, questions concerning the inflation consequences and the long 
run crowding-out effects of the debt accumulation were asked with increasing frequency.  
 
The economic impact of the announced programs has been difficult to assess and the recent 
reversal of spending plans, combined with debt consolidation attempts, makes the task even 
more complicated. A number of authors have tried to measure the effects of the announced 
measures but the answer has been contradictory (see e.g. Romer and Bernstein (2009); 
Cogan, et al. (2010), or Cwik and Wieland (2009)). Proponents of fiscal stimulus typically 
emphasize traditional Keynesian multiplier effects: when consumption is solely a function 
of after-tax income, a deficit-financed increase in government spending boosts total 
spending more than one for one. The increase in output brings about higher revenues which 3 
 
can contain the increase in government debt or even eliminate it, if the fiscal stimulus is 
properly phased-out as output reaches its potential. Since in globally integrated economies, 
domestic spending may partly be diverted to imports, proponents of fiscal expansions have 
typically called for coordinated actions, both across the Atlantic, and within Europe. Critics 
of fiscal stimulus argue that government spending displaces private spending and reduces 
domestic competitiveness. Deficit financed government spending increases, in fact, drive 
real interest rates up, inducing private savings to increase and private expenditure to fall. In 
addition, if the terms of trade are positively correlated with the real interest rates, the 
foreign spending component may also be reduced. Finally, since the real interest rate 
increases, debt may quickly raise to an unsustainable level. Thus, corrective measures will 
be required and this combination of initial expenditure increases and expenditure cuts or tax 
increases at later dates may generate perverse output effects. Such a bleak point of view is 
not shared by all critics of fiscal stimuli. By reducing debt, governments may generate 
expectations of permanently lower future costs (lower principal and lower interest 
payments) and stimulate current private spending via a permanent income mechanism. 
Thus, debt consolidations could be expansionary rather than contractionary. Unfortunately, 
the empirical evidence on this issue is also contradictory (see e.g. Coenen et al. (2008), 
Forni et. al (2010) or Afonso (2010)). In general, the uncertainty surrounding the 
consequences of fiscal measures reflects the lack of consensus on how close to a pure 
Keynesian framework developed economies are.  
 
Proponents of the fiscal stimulus have also argued that the current conditions are special, in 
the sense that both empirical evidence obtained from historical data and the predictions of 
theoretical models are not well suited to explain the effects that government spending 
increases and debt consolidation schemes may have today. In other words, the current 
situation - in which many central banks are more likely than normal to keep interest rates 
low for a protracted time period - makes existing empirical evidence less relevant, because 
information about the effects of fiscal stimulus are obtained when central banks more 
aggressively act to keep inflation and inflation expectations down. Similarly, calibration 
exercises conducted with dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models may not provide 
reliable information about the effects of planned government spending increases, even if 
the models were correctly specified and policy actions appropriately designed, because the 
parameters historically estimated are unlikely to describe well current conditions. For 
example, as suggested by Barro and Redlick (2009), the responsiveness of the labor supply 
to the fiscal expansion may be state dependent and stronger when the unemployment rate is 
large. Similarly, expectations of debt sustainability may vary with the state of the economy. 
 
Hall (2009), Woodford (2011) have recently used simple analytical frameworks within the 
mainstream New Keynesian paradigm to understand the effects of government spending in 
general, and to evaluate in which sense current conditions are special relative to historical 
experience. Coenen et al. (2010) have performed similar exercises in seven large scale 
models used in the main central banks of the developed world and in international 
institutions. The general conclusions these authors reach are simple: in normal conditions, 
expenditure increases induce modest aggregate demand effects. The short run effects could 
be magnified if spending increases come with provisions of future spending cuts (but not 
future tax increases), if monetary policy is accommodative, if pricing frictions are 
important, or if the price markup is strongly countercyclical.  Finally, as Christiano et al. 4 
 
(2009) and Erceg and Linde (2010) show, the timing of expenditure increases is crucial to 
determine the debt costs of the measures and the magnitude of the output multiplier effects.  
 
This paper empirically investigates whether the necessary conditions set up in theory for 
government expenditure expansions to be effective hold in the data. We take the predictions 
of a large class of New Keynesian models currently used in academic and policy 
institutions at face value and ask whether theoretical conditions for fiscal effectiveness are 
relevant on average, and in special circumstances capturing some features of the current 
situation. We wish to evaluate whether one is justified in making the claim that current 
expansions can produce consequences which are different from those obtained in other 
historical episodes and ask whether (i) output multipliers could be larger, (ii) debt may 
become uncontrollable and (iii) inflation responses may give monetary authorities room for 
maneuvering nominal interest rates. The focus is on the short-run effectiveness of the 
expansions but we occasionally discuss long run consequences of current measures.  
 
We study the questions of interest with a standard structural VAR model. However, we use 
state-of-the-art techniques to produce expenditure shocks with the required characteristics 
and explicitly quantify the uncertainty due to parameter estimates and shock identification. 
We recover spending shocks using sign restrictions on the response of expenditure, deficits, 
and output growth and distinguish normal situations from the current one by imposing 
additional restrictions on the dynamics of tax receipts, inflation and/or the magnitude of the 
shocks. We also evaluate the effects of consolidation schemes by imposing further 
restrictions on the dynamics of deficits or debt. To verify the predictions of the theory, we 
focus attention on the dynamic responses of the real interest rate, which is determined by 
the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy decisions; and on those of the real wage and of 
the labor wedge which depend, among other things, on the frictions present in labor and 
goods markets. Output multipliers, debt and inflation dynamics are used to compare the 
effectiveness of different policies and the dynamics of government bond yields and of the 
consumption to output ratio to understand their broader macroeconomic effects. 
  
One unique feature of our investigation is a comparison of the effects of expansionary 
spending shocks in the US, the Euro area (EA) and the UK. While one can guess that the 
same measures may not be appropriate to expand output (and decrease unemployment) for 
all countries and all states of the world (as noted in Spilimbergo et al. (2009)), most 
empirical analyses failed to draw general conclusions about the suitability of current 
packages because they have focused on the experience of individual countries. Given the 
heterogeneities in size, product market regulation and labor market rigidities present in the 
three economies, our analysis can shed light not only on whether and when fiscal policy 
could be used to boost aggregate demand, but also inform policymakers on the role of 
market frictions and institutions in determining the magnitude of the multipliers.  
 
Our work departs from the existing ones along a number of other dimensions. First, rather 
than examining the sign of consumption and investment responses, as it is common in the 
literature, we study the dynamics of the real wage, the real interest rate and the labor wedge 
since, in theory, they give us the most effective information about the questions of interest. 
Second, while most of the policy debate focuses on the magnitude of the output effects one 
should expect from current packages, we are instead interested in assessing whether the 5 
 
economic conditions under which the current packages have been designed could make 
fiscal expansions have a larger role than they had in history. Third, our focus on fiscal and 
monetary interaction allows us to study whether lack of coordination has prevented fiscal 
policy to be more effective than otherwise would be. Finally, since nominal rigidities are, in 
theory, crucial elements to deliver sizable multipliers, our investigation provides an indirect 
test of the appropriateness of the mainstream New-Keynesian paradigm. 
 
Since in the three countries we analyze legislated programs primarily involve increases in 
government consumption expenditure rather than increases in government investment, 
transfers or cut in taxes – increases in government consumption account for over 60 percent 
of the total amount of the packages - we focus attention on the effects of government 
consumption expenditure shocks only. This restrictive focus prevents us to study which 
fiscal instrument could be more effective in lessening the current recession, but has the 
advantage of maintaining a tight link with the current situation. 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the theoretical 
considerations that guide our empirical analysis and reviews the existing literature. Section 
3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents our findings. Section 5 
summarizes the results and highlights some policy conclusions. 
 
  
                                       2. Some theoretical considerations 
 
There is a considerable debate in the literature concerning the domestic effects of 
unexpected expenditure increases or tax reductions and their international spillovers. Much 
of the debate has initially focused either on the sign of the impact responses of consumption 
and the investment or on the magnitude of output multipliers. Since this literature is not 
concerned with normative statements, the presumption is that the larger are the responses of 
either output or some of its private expenditure components, the more benign is the policy. 
Empirically, the sign of consumption and investment responses is controversial: positive 
and negative responses of one or both variables can be found depending on the model 
specification and the exact measurement of the variables (compare, for example, Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002), Burnside et al. (2004) and the evidence in Caldara and Kamps (2008)).  
There is also considerable heterogeneity in the magnitude of estimated output multipliers: 
values varying from 0.5 to 3 or even larger have been obtained by researchers (see e.g., 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Barro and Redlick (2009) or Romer and Bernstein (2009)). 
 
                         2.1. Consumption and investment responses in theory 
 
Existing closed economy general equilibrium theories have sharp predictions regarding the 
sign of consumption responses and the magnitude of output multipliers in response to 
government consumption spending shocks, while there is more uncertainty about the sign 
of the investment responses. With standard time additive preferences and a competitive 
labor market, when government expenditure is unproductive and yields no utility to private 
agents, temporary, deficit financed government expenditure increases crowd out private 
consumption and generate output multipliers which are below one. This is true in both 6 
 
neoclassical and New Keynesian models, and in the latter case, when either price or wage 
frictions or both are present, as long as monetary policy is conducted with a standard Taylor 
rule (a model of this type and its predictions are presented in appendix A). 
 
The reason for this outcome is simple. Increases in government consumption expenditure 
reduce the portion of output available for private uses. Thus, unless agents considerably 
increase productive inputs, either consumption or investment or both must fall. The 
negative wealth effect increases labor supply but the effect on capital input is ambiguous. 
In general, when the production function displays decreasing returns to scale, output will 
increase by less than the increase in government consumption. Since in these models a 
permanent income motive is in place, the increase in public deficit will increase the real 
rate, making private consumption expenditure fall and private saving increase to match the 
fall in public savings. The output effects of expenditure increases can be magnified if 
public consumption expenditure yields utility (see e.g. Bouakez and Rebei (2007)) or if it 
creates production externalities (see e.g. Baxter and King (1993)). The effects could also be 
larger if preferences are represented with different functional forms (see e.g. Monacelli and 
Perotti (2008)), if increasing returns to scale are allowed in production (see Deveraux et al. 
(1996)), or if a share of agents consume a constant fraction of income (see e.g. Galí et al. 
(2007)). However, even in these cases, it is difficult to simultaneously produce output 
multipliers exceeding one and consumption responses which are significantly positive.  
 
Given the large measurement error present in consumption and output data and the 
heterogeneous evidence on the conditional dynamics of these variables, several authors 
have tried to assess the effects of government consumption expenditure disturbances using 
easier to measure or empirically less controversial variables. For example, Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1992), Galí et al. (2007) look at the dynamics of hours; while Caldara and 
Kamps (2008), and Burnside, et al. (2004) examine a number of macroeconomic variables 
and important sectorial aggregates. These studies add valuable empirical information but 
robust stylized facts are typically hard to find, making conclusions whimsical. 
 
                              2.2. The dynamics of the real wage 
 
Hall (2009) and Woodford (2011) have examined the conditions under which government 
consumption expenditure shocks can have large output effects and induce positive 
consumption dynamics in simple models featuring a variety of market arrangements and 
government policies. Their analysis points out that a necessary condition for both outcomes 
to be true is that the equilibrium real wage substantially increases in response to the shock. 
Without it, the increase in employment will be muted, thus making the output expansion 
limited. As emphasized in Pappa (2009), the dynamics of the real wage in response to 
government spending shocks can be used to test Neoclassical versus New-Keynesian 
models of transmission. In neoclassical models an increase in government spending raises 
labor supply because of a negative wealth effect. With perfect competition and diminishing 
returns to labor, the shift in labor supply rises hours and drives productivity and real 
product wages down (see first box in figure 1). In contrast, in New Keynesian models with 
imperfect competition, booms produce price wars. Thus, a rise in government spending 











































Figure 1: Labor market adjustments in response to government consumption spending 
shocks.  Wt/Pt is the real product wage, Pc is the consumption deflator, λ is the marginal 
utility of wealth and η is the Frisch labor supply function. Fn is the marginal product of 
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rising both real wages and hours, despite a productivity decline. As the second box in figure 
1 indicates, the labor supply and the labor demand both move, making it possible for real 
wages to increase, if the slopes of the curves and the magnitude of the movements are 
conventional, and for employment to expand more than in the first box. If increasing 
returns to scale in production are added to monopolistic competition in the product market, 
an increase in government spending raises real product wage, hours, and productivity (see 
e.g. Deveraux et al (1996)). As the third box of figure 1 shows, the labor demand curve is 
upward sloping in these models and shifts in the labor supply curve can increase real wages 
and employment substantially, without any need for the labor demand curve to move. 
 
Empirically, little is known about the dynamics of real wages in response to government 
spending shocks. Pappa (2009) and Perotti (2007) report that aggregate real wages  increase 
in response to consumption spending disturbances, both in US states and in a number of  
OECD countries; Nekarda and Ramey (2011) find that real wages fall at industry level 
when there is an increase in government demand for the goods produced by that industry. 
Differences in the conclusions appear to be related to the measurement of real wages, that 
is, whether nominal wages are deflated by CPI (the consumption real wage) or by the GDP 
deflator (the production real wage). Regardless of measurement issues, absolute changes in 
real wages appear to be moderate in magnitude, therefore casting doubts about the 
possibility of generating large multipliers effects through the ‘’ labor supply’’ channel. 
 
                         2.3. The dynamics of the efficiency wedge 
 
The second condition Hall and Woodford single out for expansionary government 
consumption expenditure shocks to have large positive effects on output and consumption 
is that the labor-efficiency wedge, that is the inverse of the difference between real wages 
and the marginal product of labor, negatively responds to government spending shocks. 
 
This condition is closely related to the previous real wage condition but not equivalent 
since the efficiency wedge may display the correct cyclical behavior even if the real wage 
does not. In standard neoclassical models, even when monopolistic competition is assumed, 
the efficiency wedge is constant. One way to make it time varying is to assume some form 
of nominal stickiness. As mentioned, increases in government expenditure increase hours, 
make the marginal product of labor fall, and increase marginal costs. If prices cannot be 
instantaneously adjusted, the labor-efficiency wedge must fall to ensure that the labour 
market equilibrium is reached. If the sensitivity of the labor wedge to output changes is 
large, sizeable multipliers can be created because the aggregate demand increase is 
translated less in price increases and more in output expansions. 
 
Price stickiness is sufficient but by no means necessary to induce countercyclical 
movements in the labor-efficiency wedge. For example, as discussed in Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1992), if an increase in government expenditure reduces the ability of producers 
to maintain collusion, multipliers can be uniformly larger than in the case in which 
producers do not have market power, even without price stickiness. Thus, it would be 
incorrect to use movements in the labor-efficiency wedge in response to demand shocks to 
test the sticky price assumption. Similarly, evidence of pro-cyclicality in the labor-9 
 
efficiency wedge does not signal failure of the sticky price theory, since countercyclical 
movements are only necessary to make the output multipliers large.  
 
How does the efficiency wedge behave over the business cycle and, in particular, in 
response to government spending shocks? Recently, Nekarda and Ramey (2011) find that 
increases in government demand that raise output and hours in a sector of the industry, 
lower productivity and real product wages, leaving the efficiency wedge roughly 
unchanged. Interestingly, evidence reported by Gali et al (2007) and Ramey (2009) 
indicates that, in the aggregate, labor productivity moderately increases, making increases 
in real wages a necessary condition, and large increases in real wages a sufficient condition 
for output multipliers to be large. 
 
            2.4. The role of monetary policy 
 
The third condition Hall and Woodford indicate for output changes to be large after an 
unexpected government consumption expansion is that monetary policy is accommodative. 
Unexpected increases in government spending will normally increase inflation. If the 
monetary authority strongly reacts to inflation, as it would be the case in inflation targeting 
regimes or when aggressive Taylor rules are in place, the real rate would increase, 
increasing private savings. When instead an unexpected government expenditure expansion 
is accompanied by a (temporarily) weak response of the nominal rate to inflation, the real 
rate may fall, stimulating both consumption and investment expenditure. In the unlikely 
case in which the real rate is unchanged after the spending shock – this requires a one-to-
one adjustment of the nominal rate to changes in inflation - the output multiplier is one, 
since private spending will be unaffected by the government expenditure shock. 
 
Clearly, a mechanism of this type exists only in New Keynesian models. In standard 
neoclassical models without participation constraints, and abstracting from the case where 
fiscal policy provides a nominal anchor, private decisions, rather than monetary policy, 
determine the real rate of interest. Here the real rate always increases in response to 
government consumption spending shocks since its equilibrium value it is obtained from an 
Euler equation with predetermined consumption growth. In sticky price models the ability 
of monetary policy to affect real variables via changes in the real rate of interest makes 
monetary and fiscal interactions important as far as the magnitude of output multiplier is 
concerned. Whether monetary policy helps or leans against fiscal policy is an interesting 
empirical question we will investigate. Notice also that temporary deviations from a Taylor 
principle do not necessarily affect the determinacy of the equilibrium, if fiscal policy is 
responsibly acting to curb the resulting debt increase. In addition, as long as deviations 
from the Taylor principle are temporary, inflation expectations need not be affected. 
 
In models with sticky prices, the ability of fiscal policy to affect the real economy is 
magnified when the nominal interest rate is stuck at the zero bound. Conversely, well 
designed fiscal measures may help monetary policy out of a liquidity trap. At the zero 
bound, monetary policy is unlikely to respond to inflation – the preferences of monetary 
authorities are likely to shift in this situation. Thus, as long as expansionary expenditure 
shocks generate some inflation, the real rate will fall making fiscal policy more effective. 10 
 
An interesting empirical question is whether fiscal actions can generate inflation in general, 
and in the conditions which have brought the nominal interest rate to zero. Hall (2011) 
suggests that they did not. One can conjecture that the fiscal stimulus must be large to be 
able to produce such an effect and that, if the recession which has driven the nominal 
interest rate to zero is deep and protracted, inflationary effects must be limited. On the other 
hand, if fiscal policy succeeds in generating inflation, it can give the monetary authorities 
room to maneuver the nominal interest rate. Such a view seems behind many measures 
recently taken by the Federal Reserve: the large increase in its balance sheet, in its holding 
of government debt, and in the liquidity poured into the system are all consistent with an 
attempt to make the real rate fall, and current and future inflation increase. 
 
Christiano et al. (2009) and Erceg and Linde (2010) have emphasized that the magnitude of 
the output multipliers induced by government expenditure shocks depend on how much 
time the economy spends at the zero interest rate bound and on the timing of fiscal actions. 
In particular, they find that output multipliers are larger when the expenditure expansion is 
designed and implemented at the time when a shock pushes the nominal interest rate at the 
zero bound. Delays can cause the fiscal expansion to be much less effective in bringing the 
economy back to track. In the simulation they run, delays of even one quarter can cut the 
output multiplier by half and make the debt cost of the expansions much larger. 
 
All these considerations suggest that, in the current conditions, that is, when nominal 
interest rate is close to zero, when unemployment is high, when inflation is low, and when 
growth prospects were dim, fiscal expansions could have larger effects than otherwise and 
’’ large’’ fiscal actions are probably required to bring the economy back to a growth track. 
 
Simple closed economy models are great tools to build intuition about the mechanics of the 
transmission of fiscal shocks; but they may be unsuited to shed light on existing events. 
Practical experience indicates that models with a richer set of sectorial or cross-country 
interdependencies may make conclusions much fuzzier. Luckily this does not appear to be 
the case for expenditure expansions. Coenen et al. (2010) examined the predictions of 
seven medium or large scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models used in policy 
circles and found that the same mechanisms and the same trade-offs Hall and Woodford 
highlighted are present. Thus, the insights obtained from small scale, closed economy 
models can be used to analyze potentially open and complex real world economies.  
 
                          2.5. Ceteris paribus assumptions 
 
Implicit in the discussion of the previous three subsections are a number of a ceteris paribus 
assumptions, which is useful to spell out in details. The first is that inflation expectations do 
not change when the unexpected expansions in the government consumption expenditure 
occur. Both the aggregate supply (Phillips) curve and the aggregate demand curve of the 
economy, in fact, depend on inflation expectations. If inflation expectations increase when 
government consumption expenditure expands  (for example, because monetary policy is 
accommodative), the output multiplier may be small, even in the ideal conditions we have 
described, and the inflation increase larger than otherwise, because outward movements in 
the aggregate demand are  neutralized by  inward movements in the aggregate supply. 11 
 
Thus, the previous arguments assume that the fiscal expansion will not create perceptions 
of higher future inflation. Conversely, the output effects of fiscal expansions will be 
maximized when inflation expectations are non-increasing in the fiscal impulse. 
 
The second assumption implicitly made is that, in response to government expenditure 
changes, the sensitivity of private spending to the real interest rate and output changes is 
unaffected. For example, all exercises assume that in response to the fiscal disturbances, 
consumption does not become less sensitive to the real rate and more sensitive to current 
income, making agents  more ‘’Keynesian’’ and less ‘’Neoclassical’’. If the IS (Euler) 
curve is time varying, as it will be the case if consumers may become credit constrained or  
more prudent  in certain states of nature, the aggregate demand curve may shift and rotate 
backward, making it difficult to predict both the magnitude and the direction of the output 
effects of the fiscal expansions.  
 
Finally, future output growth expectations are also assumed to remain constant. In a 
dynamic setting, the aggregate demand curve is a function of future expected output. If 
current fiscal expansions change future output prospects, for example, because agents 
expect higher future distorting taxes, current demand expansions may be completely or 
partially undone by the expected fall in future output growth. If this occurs, output 
multipliers could be small, zero, or even negative, even when the theoretical conditions for 
fiscal effectiveness are satisfied. 
 
                  2.6.   A summary  
 
For government spending disturbances to have substantial output effects the following three 
conditions should hold: (a) real wages should increase substantially; (b) the labor-efficiency 
wedge should fall considerably; (c) monetary policy should be accommodative. It is unclear 
which condition plays the most important role. The first two requirements are likely to 
boost the supply side effects of the shock, making the aggregate supply flatter, while the 
latter determines the magnitude of the aggregate demand shift. Non-negative movements in 
private expenditure are necessary for output to increase following government expenditure 
shocks in this latter case. However, unless the real wage increases sufficiently to motivate 
agents to supply the labor needed to make output expansions possible, unless the demand 
increase is translated in quantity rather than price expansions, and unless monetary policy is 
accommodative, the increase in government consumption expenditure will simply crowd 
out private demand or increase inflation. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature has not yet examined whether these 
three conditions hold in the data, whether they are necessary for making output multipliers 
large, whether they are more likely to hold when the special conditions characterizing 
today’s world economy are in place and, in general, whether the predictions of models with 
pricing frictions have sufficient support in the data. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) 
have studied the effects of fiscal policy in recessions and expansions and found that they 
are different. Kirchner et al. (2010) also study whether the state of the economy affects the 
nature of the transmission of fiscal shocks. They notice that the size of the long run output 
multipliers has declined over time and attribute this fact to a weaker response of the real 12 
 
wage and a stronger response of the nominal interest rate to government spending shocks. 
However, neither work addresses the questions of interest in this paper nor provides 
evidence on the interaction between labor markets, pricing frictions and monetary policy in 
determining the dynamics induced by government consumption spending disturbances. 
 
Most theoretical analyses assume that increases in government consumption expenditure 
are financed with lump sum taxes or, if debt is generated, that it will eventually be reduced 
back to the steady state via lump sum taxation. Furthermore, it is typically assumed that 
such policy does not affect either government credibility or expectations of future fiscal 
sustainability. Uhlig (2010) highlights an old but often forgotten issue: the financing of 
government expenditure matters for the conclusions one reaches. Under the more realistic 
assumption that only distorting taxes are available, the output multipliers generated by a 
public expenditure expansion can be negative – the expected distortions due to the tax 
increase dominates the employment and output gains induced by the shocks. Furthermore, 
how fast the government seeks to return the debt to its original level affects the magnitude 
and the sign of the multipliers. An alternative policy, which can potentially produce large 
positive output effects, is one that cuts distorting taxes now and increases them in the 
future. Such a policy produces Laffer curve type of dynamics, making deficit and debt 
accumulation much smaller. In general, who finances the deficit (domestic or foreign 
residents), how debt consolidations are performed and which instrument is used, are all 
likely to be crucial to understand the effects of fiscal changes. 
 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that fiscal expansions are unlikely to exercise an 
instantaneous effect on the economy. Apart from gestation and legislative delays, there is 
some evidence that fiscal and monetary policies affect the variability of real variables at 
different frequencies. For example, Rossi and Zubairy (2009) show that government 
expenditure shocks explain a large portion of output variability in the medium run, but their 
ability to affect output variability at business cycle frequencies is small – and the opposite 
is true for monetary policy. Thus, the fiscal lever may take much longer than the monetary 
lever to exercise its effects and the lack of noticeable output growth effects in many OECD 
countries, despite the large fiscal impulse in 2009, appears to be consistent with this fact. 
 
 
3. The data and the empirical framework 
 
We use quarterly data for the US, the Euro Area (EA) and the UK in the exercise. Data for 
the US comes from the FRED data base at the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); for the EA 
it comes from the Area-wide model data base (version 9), and for the UK from the OECD 
data base and IFS statistics of the IMF. For each country, the variables entering the VARs 
are: the log ratio of government consumption expenditure to output, the log ratio of total tax 
receipts to output, the log of one plus the annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate of real 
per-capita output, the log of one plus the annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate of real 
wages, the log of one plus the ex-post annualized real interest rate, the log of the profit rate; 
the log of one plus the annualized inflation rate, the log of one plus the yield on long term 
government bonds, and the personal consumption expenditure to output ratio. The choice of 13 
 
scaling for each variable ensures that the VAR is roughly free from low frequency 
movements. Appendix B describes the construction of each variable from the available raw 
series. For the EA we have also considered the fiscal data bases of Paredes et al. (2009) and 
Forni et al. (2009). The series for government consumption expenditure and for total tax 
receipts differ in the three data bases in the 1970s, because of different interpolation 
procedures used to transform annual into quarterly data and because the sources of 
information vary. From the early 1990s, the series largely overlap and their correlation is 
above 0.9. Thus, for the more recent period, it is immaterial which dataset is used. 
 
One may wonder what fiscal disturbances in the EA mean when a central fiscal authority 
does not exist. However, at least over the last 20 years, discretionary fiscal policy have 
strongly commoved in the EA (see e.g. Giuliadori and Beetsma, 2008). Furthermore, since 
aggregate EA fiscal data is a weighted average of the corresponding components of country 
specific variables, the results we present can be interpreted as driven by shocks occurring in 
the countries which have the largest weight in the EA. 
 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) have argued that to properly measure the effects of government 
shocks, real wages need to be computed deflating nominal wages by a product market 
deflator rather than a consumption deflator. While the difference is irrelevant in a one-
sector model, in a two-sector model the two series may have different dynamics. We have 
constructed both consumption and product real wages using CPI and the GDP deflator and 
compared their dynamics in responses to government consumption expenditure shocks. 
While the consumption real wage typically is more volatile and less correlated with output, 
government spending shocks induce dynamics for the two series which are quite similar. 
Thus, we present only product real wages responses. 
 
To measure the labor-efficiency wedge we considered two different series. One is the profit 
share, i.e. the difference between one and the labor share in output. This measure is a very 
rough proxy of the wedge and may be contaminated by serious measurement error. The 
second, which is more related to the theory, uses the difference between the real wage and 
labor productivity. While the two measures have different levels, they display similar 
cyclical fluctuations. Thus, we present only results obtained with the first measure. 
 
We employ the ex-post real rate and the inflation rate in the VAR rather than the nominal 
interest rate and the inflation rate for computational convenience. The results we present, 
however, are unchanged if the dynamics of the ex-ante real rate (constructed using VAR 
based inflation expectations) are consider. The yields on long term government bonds are 
not of direct interest in the investigation but are used to assess deviations from the ceteris 
paribus assumptions. 
 
The sample period used to estimate the VAR depends on the country. For the US we start 
in 1984Q1 and end in 2009:4, for the EA we start at 1993Q1 and end in 2008Q4 and for the 
UK we start in 1993Q1 and end in 2009Q4. The starting date is chosen trying to maintain 
as much time homogeneity as possible in each country. For cross country comparability, we 
have also examined the sample 1993Q1-2009Q4 for the US: the results we report are 
unaffected by this change. In addition, since for the US data is available since the early 
1950s, while for in the EA and the UK since the early 1970s, we have examined whether 14 
 
the conclusions are altered when the longer samples are considered. Overall, the qualitative 
features of the results are insensitive to the sample period, but the standard errors in the 
longer samples are larger reflecting the presence of considerable time heterogeneity. 
 
We use four lags for each variable and a constant in the VAR and employ a Bayesian prior 
to conserve degrees of freedom. The prior is quite standard (see e.g. Canova, 2007, chapter 
9), it is described in appendix C and allows analytical computation of the posterior 
distribution of the VAR coefficients. Using Monte Carlo techniques, we draw 2000 
coefficient vectors from these distributions, and for each draw we try to identify a deficit 
financed expansionary government consumption expenditure shock imposing, at a 
minimum, three instantaneous sign restrictions: (i) government consumption expenditure 
increases; (ii) deficit increases; (iii) the growth rate of output increases. Sign restrictions are 
preferable to more traditional type restrictions for the identification of fiscal shocks because 
they can be made consistent with the theory that is used to interpret the results – for 
example, the model in the appendix robustly generates these restrictions when the structural 
parameters are allowed to vary within a reasonable range and when nuisance features, such 
as the specification of price stickiness, are modeled in different ways (see e.g. Pappa 
(2009)). Perhaps more importantly for our purpose, sign restrictions allow us to design 
expenditure shocks with complex and realistic patterns - more standard approaches based 
on a triangular decomposition of the covariance matrix or the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
approach, lack this flexibility. We choose to impose only contemporaneous restrictions 
because existing theories have fragile dynamic predictions for the response of government 
consumption expenditure, government deficit and output growth. To make sure that sign 
restrictions hold sufficiently often, for each draw of the coefficient vector, we draw up to 
5000 orthonormal matrices rotating the contemporaneous covariance matrix of the shocks – 
appendix C explains how to do this. Thus, up to 10,000,000 Monte Carlo extractions are 
performed for each country and in each scenario and, contrary to similar exercises in the 
literature, the responses we present reflect both coefficient and identification uncertainty. 
 
Finally, we want to stress that, since we are using the log of government consumption 
expenditure over output and the log of output per-capita in the VAR, the multipliers we 
construct are not directly comparable to those available in the empirical literature – the log 
of government consumption expenditure and the log of output are typically employed
1. In 
general, the multipliers we present are compatible with those derived in theory when 
population is exogenously growing and output growth is, on average, positive.  
                                            
             4. The evidence 
 
To facilitate the presentation of the results, we split the discussion in a number of parts. 
                                                 
1 To have an idea of how to compare, suppose that population does not change and that the partial change 
operator can be interchanged with the log operator - which is not necessarily the case. Then, the effect of a 
change in expenditure to output ratio on output (scaled by the steady state values of the two variables) is 
equivalent to how much the square of output will change when expenditure changes (scaled by the steady 
state G/Y^2 ratio).  Thus, the multipliers found in the literature are, to a first approximation, square root of the 
numbers we present.  
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First, we describe the average responses of the three variables of interest and of per-capita 
output multipliers to government consumption expenditure shocks over the samples  – 
averages are computed allowing for both coefficient and identification uncertainty. Second, 
to evaluate the importance of the three theoretical conditions, we compare output 
multipliers when additional constraints are imposed. Third, we examine whether the 
responses of the three variables of interest and the per-capita output multipliers are different 
in scenarios that mimic the current economic situation and discuss the debt and inflation 
consequences of fiscal expansions. Fourth, we consider expenditure expansions which are 
accompanied by future deficit and debt consolidation provisions.   
 
                                   4.1. What happens on average in the sample? 
 
Figure 2 shows the average responses of real wages, of the real rate of interest, of the labor-
efficiency wedge and of the per-capita output multiplier for horizons up to 20 quarters. We 
report the point-wise median response (red circled line) and the point-wise one standard 
error posterior interval (blue dashed lines) at each horizon; row 1 refers to the US, row 2 to 
the EA, and row 3 to the UK.  
 














































































Figure 2: Responses to a deficit financed government consumption expenditure shock and 
per-capita output multipliers. The horizontal axis reports the horizon in quarters. 
 
Overall, the data is not very informative about the dynamics of the real wage, the real rate 
of interest and the labor-efficiency wedge in response to deficit financed expansionary 
government consumption disturbances. In terms of point estimates, the real wage falls in 
the US and the UK, and increases in the EA; the real rate increases in the US and falls in 
the EA and the UK; and the labor wedge falls in the US and increases in the EA and the 16 
 
UK. However, in all countries, responses are insignificant at all horizons. We can think of 
three potential reasons for this outcome. First, the shocks we have identified mix structural 
shocks of different types. We find it hard to conceive meaningful theoretical disturbances 
whose impact implications for government consumption expenditure, the deficit and output 
growth are identical to the ones we consider. Second, measurement errors dominate. While 
this is a possibility for the labor wedge measure, it is difficult to believe that the problem is 
relevant for the real rate. Moreover, since both the consumption real wage and the product 
real wage display similar responses, measurement error is unlikely to be the main reason 
for the lack of information in the data. The third possibility is that, in the samples we 
consider, there are episodes where deficit financed expansionary consumption expenditure 
shocks induce positive responses of each of the three variables and episodes where the 
responses are negative. In other words, the identification restrictions we employ are 
insufficient to get a precise view of the dynamics of these variables. Labor markets, 
monetary policy and the markups may react both ways, depending on circumstances that 
the analysis so far has not controlled for. 
 
The dynamics of the real wage in the US are at odds with the characterization of the 
empirical evidence presented in Ramey (2009). She, in fact, claims that in the US the real 
wage increases when expenditure shocks are identified though VARs and falls when they 
are identified with large unexpected military expansions. In contrast, figure 1 shows that 
the median impact response of the real wage is negative in our VAR. More importantly, the 
figure indicates that, unless other restrictions are imposed, the responses of the real wage 
cannot be signed with high probability at any horizons in the VAR systems we consider. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that we are unable to sign the response of the three variables 
that theory singles out as crucial for understanding the magnitude of the output effects of 
government expenditure shocks, we cannot say much about the magnitude of the per-capita 
output multipliers either. In the US the instantaneous median estimate is slightly below 2.0 
and constant across horizons; in the EA it is also slightly below 2.0 and decreasing with the 
horizon; in the UK is below 1.0 and increasing with the horizon. However, since the 
multipliers are imprecisely estimated, we cannot exclude with high probability that they are 
less than one at any horizon in all three countries. 
 
                                           4.2. Adding identification restrictions 
 
Since the patterns present in figure 2 are quite robust to standard specification changes 
analyzed in the literature (for example, they are robust to changes in the sample period, the 
lag length and the transformation of the variables entering the VAR, etc.), one could stop 
the analysis and simply conclude that the data is unable to provide clear conclusions 
regarding the relevance of the theory. Rather than giving up the investigation, we study 
whether inference could be sharpened by adding identification restrictions. Thus, in 
addition to the constraints on the instantaneous responses of government consumption 
expenditure, the deficit and output growth, we also restrict either the contemporaneous 
response of the real wage, of the real rate, of the labor wedge or all three responses jointly. 
To make sure that the ceteris paribus conditions roughly hold, we also require the responses 
of bond yields to be instantaneously unchanged. Adding identification restrictions implies 17 
 
that the response intervals of figure 2 are sliced and certain scenarios eliminated. We want 
to determine whether the data could have been consistent with certain impact constraints on 
the real wage, the real rate, and the labor wedge and whether these restrictions help us to 
better measure output multipliers.  
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                         Average                                  Adding restrictions 
                                                     r<0             w>0            Wedge<0           All     
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
US                      1.93                 2.20             0.33               3.26                4.84  
                      (0.65, 6.47)    (2.03, 2.22)   (0.28, 0.35)   (3.13, 3.28)     (4.70, 4.98) 
EA                      1.86                 2.62             0.15               0.54                3.64 
                      (0.56, 7.92)     (2.55, 2.69)   (0.11, 0.16)   (0.51, 0.58)    (3.56, 3.73)                  
UK                     0.89                 1.90              0.22               0.08                2.20  
                      (0.33, 3.21)     (1.86, 1.94)  (0.18, 0.25)    (0.05, 0.09)    (2.15, 2.24) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 1:  Contemporaneous per-capita output multipliers. Median estimates with standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 1, which reports the instantaneous output per-capita multiplier obtained in each of the 
four exercises we conduct (posterior one standard error intervals are in parenthesis), 
displays a few interesting facts. First, imposing any of the three restrictions sharpens 
inference quite a lot and the magnitude of the multipliers is much better measured. Second, 
adding that the real rate falls in response to government consumption expenditure 
disturbances makes output multipliers in all countries larger relative to the median we 
obtain on average. Thus, an accommodative monetary policy is very important for 
expenditure expansions to be effective. The gain is particularly large for the UK which, it is 
worth recalling, was in an inflation targeting regime during the sample period. Third, 
restricting real wages to be positive is insufficient to make instantaneous per-capita output 
multipliers large. In fact, the per-capita multipliers we obtain in this case are the smallest of 
all and are in the tails of the distribution of multipliers produced on average. To put this 
result differently, increases in the real wage are necessary but by no mean sufficient to 
produce large output expansions. Fourth, imposing that the labor efficiency wedge falls 
generates different results in different countries: per-capita output multipliers are larger in 
the US; but in the EA and the UK they are significantly below one. There are two potential 
explanations for this heterogeneity. It could be that, in the relevant region, nominal frictions 
are much more important for the US than the other two countries, making the slope of the 
Phillips curve much flatter in the US than in Europe. Alternatively, the marginal product of 
labor reacts to changes in fiscal variables in US but not in Europe, thus making it possible 
to produce a larger output at a given cost. Finally, imposing that all three conditions are 
satisfied increases the magnitude of per-capita output multipliers in all countries. In the US 
the gain is the largest; in the UK imposing all the restrictions only marginally increases per-
capita multipliers relative to the case where only restrictions on the real rate are used. 
 
Differences in the nature of the three economies may account for the differences in the 
magnitude of the per-capita multipliers across the rows of table 1. For example, the UK, 
which is much more open to trade than the EA or the US, has uniformly smaller per-capita 18 
 
multipliers than the other two countries. However, other important idiosyncrasies seem to 
matter less. Consider labor market institutions, for instance. It is well known that in the EA 
the real wage adjusts much more slowly than, say, in the US in response to shocks because 
of the nature of labor market (in particular, because of the strength of unions and the high 
replacement costs). Thus, one would expect that imposing a fast response of the real wage 
to expenditure shock (as it is done in the third column of the table) would make output 
multipliers larger in the EA relative to the other two countries. Clearly, this is not the case. 
Similarly, the size of the government does not appear to be relevant to explain magnitude 
differences. As indicated, e.g. in Gali (1994), the larger is the size of the government, the 
stronger are the stabilization properties of expenditure shocks and therefore, the largest are 
output multipliers. On average, output multipliers in the EA – where government size is the 
largest – and in the US – where it is the smallest – are similar. Thus, having a large public 
sector is irrelevant when the theoretical conditions we highlight are satisfied. 
 
To summarize, a standard sticky-price New Keynesian model appears to provide useful 
guidance to understand the mechanisms leading to effective fiscal expansions and when the 
conditions on the real rate, the real wage and the labor efficiency wedge are satisfied, 
expenditure increases can lead to large output expansions. Of the three conditions the 
theory has singled, accommodative monetary policy appears to be the most relevant one 
and real wages which are sensitive to demand conditions the least crucial one. Cross 
country differences in the magnitude of per-capita output multipliers appear to be driven by 
two main factors: cyclicality of the labor wedge and trade openness. Other things being 
equal, the more open a country and the less reactive the markup to cyclical conditions are, 
the smaller is the per-capita output multiplier that an expenditure expansion generates.  
  
                                 4.3 Are the conditions of 2009-2010 different? 
 
It is often claimed in policy circles that the current conditions are different from those 
prevailing, on average, in the past. Commentators often cite the fact that the current 
recession is deeper than any other post WWII recession; that the fiscal packages came after 
an important financial crisis; that they were enacted at a time when the ability of monetary 
policy to stabilize cyclical fluctuations was limited; and that unprecedented global factors 
matter. To the extent that the current fiscal expansion occurs in a truly unique environment, 
it is impossible to use past data to learn about its macroeconomic consequences. However, 
if episodes with similar characteristics could have been realized in the past – in the sense 
that the existing economic conditions had some probability to have materialized in the 
sample - we can study whether the three necessary conditions for effectiveness of fiscal 
policy are more likely to hold in these situations and analyze whether the perceived wisdom 
that the magnitude of the output multiplier is larger than in normal times is correct or not. 
 
Given the lack of measures of financial tightness in the VAR and the linear framework we 
use, our exercise is limited in scope. Nevertheless, we can mimic the current situation in 
two important respects. First, we can analyze the dynamics of macroeconomic variables 
when the size of the consumption expenditure shock (or the size of the induced deficit) is 
large relative to historical standards and the nominal rate cannot move in response to the 
shock. Second, we can study whether consumption expenditure shocks taking place in 19 
 
recessions, where by this we mean expenditure shocks accompanied by a simultaneous fall 
in tax revenues and in inflation, are different from those we have recover on average. To 
produce the first set of circumstances, we impose, in addition to restrictions on the 
contemporaneous response of expenditure, deficit and output growth, the constraints that 
the government expenditure to output ratio (deficit to output ratio) increases on impact by 
at least 1 percent (0.5 percent) and that the nominal rate is unchanged
2. In the second case, 
we add the restrictions that tax revenues and the inflation rate contemporaneously fall in 
response to the shock. Given that restrictions on the magnitude of the impact response of 
the government expenditure to output ratio or the deficit to output ratio produce 
qualitatively similar dynamics, we only report results obtained restricting the former. We 
summarize the constraints used in the third and fourth column of table 2. Figure 3 reports 
the responses of the variables of interest in the “large spending” scenario. Figure 4 presents 
the corresponding responses for the “recessions” scenario. In each figure, the first row 
corresponds to the US, the second to the EA and the third to the UK. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        Basic    Conditional  Large  Spending  Recession  Reversals    Consolidation 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
G spending         >0                 >0             >>0                 >0           >0 and <0        >0 
                                                                                                    after 2 quarters            
 Deficit                >0                >0              >0                   >0            >0                 >0 and <0 
                                                                                                                          after 2 quarters 
GDP growth        >0               >0               >0                  >0            >0                    >0 
Real wage growth                   >0               
Real rate                                  >0               
Labor wedge                           >0               
Nominal rate                                              =0  
Tax revenues                                                                   <0 
Inflation                                                                           <0 
Bond yield                                =0 
C/Y                                           =0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 2:  Contemporaneous identifying restrictions for different scenarios. 
 
Large expenditure shocks taking place when the nominal rate is fixed make the real rate fall 
roughly by the same amount in all countries while the pattern of responses of the other two 
variables is heterogeneous: the real wage falls in the US and UK, and increases in the EA; 
the labor efficiency wedge increases in the US and in the EA, and falls in the UK.  On the 
other hand, per-capita output multipliers are roughly similar in size and significantly less 
than one in the EA and the UK, while the multiplier in the US is about three times as large 
and significantly above one, at least on impact. Thus, in this scenario, the dynamics of the 
real wage, the real rate and the labor efficiency wedge do not fully determine the magnitude  
                                                 
2 We have also considered a different scenario where the nominal interest rate is fixed at zero rather than at 
the steady state. Since this scenario had negligible probability to have materialized in the past, little can be 




Figure 3: Dynamics in response to deficit financed large expenditure shocks when the 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the output effects of the expenditure expansion.  Since in all countries the real interest 
rate falls roughly the same amount, it is highly unlikely that differences in the way the IS 
curve shifts are responsible for the differences we observe. 
 
In recessions, unexpected increases in government spending drive the real rate up in all 
countries while, once again, the response of the other two variables is heterogeneous: real 
wage increases in the US and the EA, and decreases in the UK; and the efficiency wedge 
increases in the US and the UK and decreases in the EA. Interestingly, monetary policy is 
quite tight in all countries in the recession scenario - in the US and the EA the nominal rate 
falls but less than inflation; in the UK the nominal rate increases despite the decrease in 
inflation – and this tightness seems to be responsible for the modest per-capita output 
multipliers we obtain. Note that the slightly larger magnitude of the per-capita output 
multiplier in the EA appears to be due to the movements in the real wage, which are 
considerably larger than in the other countries. 
 
Comparing figures 3 and 4 one can see that even though the two scenarios are designed to 
capture aspects of the current situation, they produce different implications for the real 
wage, the real rate and the labor efficiency wedge in each country. It is also worth pointing 
out that, even though the real rate responds negatively in figure 3 and positively in figure 4, 
per-capita multipliers are not uniformly larger in the ‘’large expenditure’’ scenario. Thus, it 
is important to look at other variables to be able to interpret the pattern we obtain. 
  
Three important conclusions can be drawn from the exercises we conduct in this 
subsection. Per-capita output multipliers generated in situations like those prevailing in 
2009-2010 are unlikely to be larger than those obtained on average in the past, primarily 
because the conditions for effectiveness of fiscal expansions are either not satisfied or less 
sufficient in these scenarios. Moreover, it is unclear which of the conditions characterizing 
the current situations matter most. In the US the per-capita output multiplier is larger when 
the size of the shocks is large and the nominal rate is unchanged, but in the EA it is larger 
when a recession is ongoing.  Interestingly, the role of fiscal policy in the US during 
recessions is rather small: the per-capita output multiplier we generate in this situation is 
among the smallest of all we obtain. This conclusion should be compared with those of 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) who, employ a different technique, and find that 
fiscal policy has quite different effects in recessions and expansions. 
 
Perhaps more interesting, the pattern of responses we present is somewhat difficult to 
explain within the New Keynesian paradigm we have used as reference. For example, in the 
EU accommodative monetary policy do not seems enough to produce large output 
expansions and the conditions which would make the aggregate supply curve flatter are 
generally violated in the environments we consider. What could drive these results? One 
possibility is that some of the ceteris paribus conditions do not hold in some of these 
scenarios or, given some scenario, they may hold in some countries but not others. Another 
is that the New Keynesian framework we have used as organizing principle to interpret the 
evidence cannot account for the extreme events we consider in this subsection.  We 




                                       4.4 The effects on debt and inflation 
 
An important part of the public debate, following the extraordinary fiscal packages many 
countries legislated in 2009, had to do with the size of the debt, the increased perception of 
default and the inflation effects they would produce.  Many commentators believed that the 
legislation would have generated unsustainable debt dynamics and financial markets agreed 
and reacted in the spring and the fall of 2010 by increasing the spread between bonds yields 
of countries with potentially unsustainable debt. On the other hand, many policy-markers 
believed that the fiscal packages would not have impaired the sustainability of the debt if 
they managed to generate sufficient output expansions and some inflation. There would 
have been also an important by-product if the latter happened: higher inflation meant that 
central banks could have acquired some room for maneuvering again the traditional 
monetary policy instrument – a possibility which waned when nominal interest rates 
reached the zero bound. In this subsection, we examine the debt and inflation dynamics 
induced by expansionary deficit-financed consumption expenditure disturbances taking 
place in the two scenarios analyzed in the previous subsection. The fifth and sixth columns 
of figures 3 and 4 display the responses of the debt to output ratio and of inflation to the 
shocks; again the first row refers to the US, the second to the EA and the third to the UK. 
 
Since government debt is not a variable of the VAR, we construct debt to output dynamic 
responses using a budget constraint identity, as in Favero and Giavazzi (2007), assuming 
that at time zero the debt to output ratio is at the steady state, that one-period real bonds are 
used to finance the deficit and that no corrective measures are taken at any horizons in the 
future. Thus, the debt to output dynamics we present are those that would have been 
generated if the government completely disregarded the effects that a temporary shock to 
consumption expenditure would have on future debt and expectations were constant. 
 
In the US, shocks that increase expenditure by a large amount when the nominal rate is 
unchanged leave the debt to output ratio unchanged in the short run and decrease it in the 
medium run. In the median, and after 8 quarters, one should expect about a one percent 
decrease from the steady state level. Authors’ calculations suggest that if the shock lasts six 
rather than one quarter, the debt to output ratio effect at the 8 quarter horizon would be 
roughly 5 times larger (in absolute value). Thus, the fact that shocks are large does not 
necessarily induce uncontrolled debt dynamics. Two reasons explain this result: the fall in 
the real rate reduces the service costs of the debt; the output increase produces a significant 
increase in tax revenues. Given that the nominal rate is instantaneously fixed and that the 
real rate falls, large expenditure shocks increase inflation. However, the increase is short 
very lived. The response of the debt to output ratio in a recession is significantly positive 
and somewhat larger in size since the real rate increases and tax revenues fall here. In the 
median, a deficit financed government consumption expansion adds two percentage points 
to the debt to output ratio after 8 quarters. Afterward the effect becomes insignificant. 
 
In the EA, the debt to output ratio modestly but significantly increases in both scenarios. 
Quantitatively, it is expected to increase by about one percentage point after 8 quarters and 
to reach its new steady state about 2 percent higher after 5 years. As in the US, the inflation 
rate increases with large spending shocks, but the effect is also short lived. In the UK, large 24 
 
expenditure shocks occurring when the nominal rate is instantaneously unchanged induce 
debt and inflation dynamics which are similar to those of the EA: debt to GDP is positive, it 
reaches a new steady state about 2 percent higher after 4.5 years, and inflation 
instantaneously increases but the effect is short lived. Since the magnitude of the changes in 
the real rate, in output per-capita and in tax revenues are similar, the magnitude of the 
changes in the debt to GDP ratio and inflation in the EA and the UK are also similar. 
However, contrary to the US, tax revenues to GDP fall in the EA and UK in both scenarios. 
 
To understand why the results do not conform to the predictions of the class of New 
Keynesian models we consider, it is useful to study why the dynamics of inflation differ in 
the two scenarios. The last two columns of figures 3 and 4 show the dynamics of the yield 
on long term government bonds and of the consumption to output ratio. Recall that when 
deriving theoretical predictions, we have implicitly assumed that the responses of the 
former are negligible. In practice, this does not appear to be the case. 
 
The yield on long term government bonds increases in the US and the EA and decreases in 
the UK in the “large expenditure” scenario, while it increases in the EA and falls in the US 
and UK in the “recession” scenario. Thus, either long term inflation expectations, or long 
term output expectations, or both change following an unexpected increase in government 
expenditure. Also, while in the EA and the UK the sign of the responses are the same in the 
two scenarios, in the US the sign switches. Thus, differences in the dynamics of the real 
rate, real wage and of the per-capita multiplier in the two scenarios could be due to this sign 
difference. In general, it appears that the aggregate supply curve shifts when the aggregate 
demand moves, making the outcome of the fiscal expansion somewhat unpredictable. 
 
The consumption to output ratio falls in both scenarios and in all countries. Thus, it appears 
that the sensitivity of consumption to current income decreases in response to the shock.  If 
agents are more prudent in their spending patterns, or lose confidence about the future 
evolution of the economy in these situations, then savings may increase or dis-savings may 
fall when output increases. There is plenty of evidence that consumers become more 
prudent in spending their income in recessions or when the economic environment is less 
favorable. Regardless of the which explanation is correct, an increase in government 
spending in these scenarios does not only shift the aggregate demand curve, but it also 
changes its slope and can even twist it backward, if  investment is similarly affected. 
 
In sum, expansionary expenditure shocks occurring in scenarios that mimic the current 
situation induce only modest debt to output ratio dynamics. The magnitude of the responses 
is country and somewhat state dependent and the sign of the revenue responses shapes both 
their magnitude and their sign. The inflation effects of large expansionary shocks are quite 
temporary and similar across countries. Thus, while in theory there is this possibility that 
fiscal expansions may give monetary policy some lever to move nominal rates, in practice, 
this appears to remain just a wishful hope. Finally, in the two scenarios we consider, 
increases in government spending do not only shift the aggregate demand curve but also 
twist it and alter the aggregate supply locus, making the conditions on the real wage, the 
real rate and the labor efficiency wedge neither necessary nor sufficient for effective fiscal 
expansions and the magnitude of per-capita output multipliers difficult to interpret. 25 
 
                                           4.5 Consolidation schemes 
 
The tensions in the markets for sovereign debt of 2010 have brought back at the center 
stage of public attention the question of the sustainability of public debt and the need for 
fiscal consolidation schemes that bring the debt back to manageable levels. As we have 
seen, fears of uncontrolled debt dynamics do not appear to have a strong empirical 
foundation. Nevertheless, analyzing consolidation schemes is useful since it may shed 
important light on the nature of the adjustments taking place in these situations. 
 
Since earlier work by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), there is a widespread folk wisdom in 
the profession that consolidation schemes could be expansionary. The idea is that by 
creating expectations of a permanently sounder policy stance, agents may be induced to 
expand private spending by more than the fall in government absorption. Recently, Afonso 
(2010) has shown that effects of this type are present in the EA when consolidation 
schemes considerably reduce the real rate of interest and thus the financing cost of the 
debt. Coenen et al. (2008), on the other hand, using the estimated New-area wide model 
employed at the ECB, show that fiscal consolidations are always contractionary in the 
short run, even though they may generate positive long run output effects. Forni et al 
(2010) also confirm that short run costs could be large. This variety of opinions about the 
macroeconomic consequences of consolidation schemes is present also in the policy arena 
and, for example, following the G-20 meeting of the summer of 2010, many US officials 
believed that the measures adopted by the EA would have led the area into a new great 
depression – cutting expenditure when economic activity had not recovered would have 
made the situation worse than no action at all. 
 
Our empirical model allows us to consider two consolidation schemes discussed in the 
literature: current expenditure expansions accompanied by future expenditure cuts (the so-
called spending reversals); current expenditure expansions accompanied by future deficit 
cuts (obtained either by future expenditure cuts or by future revenue increases). Corsetti et 
al. (2009) claim that, other things being equal, spending reversals can help making the size 
of the output multiplier larger by signaling agents the temporary nature of the measures 
and the commitment of the government to return to the fiscal orthodoxy as soon as the 
negative circumstances requiring the fiscal stimulus are removed. Uhlig (2010) warns 
instead against deficit consolidation schemes carried out too rapidly. When lump sum taxes 
are not available, expectations of future tax increases can make current output multipliers 
negative. Canova and Pappa (2006) document that unexpected expenditure  increases 
which are rapidly matched with increases in distorting tax revenues had historically large 
and negative effects in US states that are required by constitution or legislation to balance 
the budget at the end of the year (or of the fiscal cycle). 
 
The last two columns of table 2 display the identification restrictions used in these two 
scenarios and figures 5 and 6 the dynamic responses of the variables of interest: the first 
row refers to the US, the second to the EA and the third to the UK. We present expenditure 
schemes which are reversed after two quarters, but the results are qualitatively unchanged 
if the reversal is expected to take place four periods after the initial government 
consumption expenditure shock occurs. More importantly for interpretation purposes, the  26 
 
 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Dynamics in response to a deficit financed government expenditure shock which 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































spending reversal and the deficit consolidation programs are assumed to be known to 
agents when government consumption expenditure unexpectedly increases. 
 
Government expenditure reversal schemes induce positive real wage responses and 
negative labor efficiency wedge responses in all countries. However, while in the EA the 
real rate decreases, it increases in the other two countries. Per-capita output multipliers are 
only slightly above one in the US and the UK, and considerably above one in the EA. Thus, 
the dynamics of the real rate are crucial to determine the magnitude of the real effects of 
government spending shocks also in this scenario. Note that the program makes inflation 
fall in the US and the UK, but strongly increases it in the EA. Interestingly, monetary 
policy appears to significantly deviate from the Taylor principle in this scenario: in the US 
the nominal interest rate is roughly unchanged when inflation falls; in the EA the nominal 
interest rate is roughly unchanged despite the increase in inflation; in the UK a fall in 
inflation is accompanied by a fall in the nominal rate, but of a smaller magnitude. 
 
To understand why the dynamics of inflation are different in the three countries, it is useful 
to examine the behavior of the long term government bond yields, which in this scenario 
are likely to provide us with information about long term inflation expectations. In the UK, 
inflation falls because the program shifts not only the aggregate demand, but also the 
aggregate supply curve. As we have mentioned, the aggregate supply curve depends on 
expected future inflation. Since the reversal scheme reduces long term inflation 
expectations, it induces a shift to the right in the aggregate supply curve and the combined 
movement of the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply schedules make current 
inflation fall. In the EA, the shift in the aggregate demand curve is instead accompanied by 
an increase in long term inflation expectations. Thus, the aggregate supply shifts inward 
following the increase in government consumption expenditure and this creates 
considerable inflation. The US pattern is difficult to justify since inflation falls and at the 
same time long term inflation expectations increase. One possible explanation is that the 
scheme is not entirely credible and the reversal is perceived as temporary, making the 
aggregate supply curve temporarily move outward and then overshoot inward in the 
medium long run. Alternatively, the shock may alter, e.g. the steady state markup may be 
altered, making the aggregate supply curve rotate. 
 
The dynamics of the private consumption to output ratio are also useful to interpret the 
results we obtain. Recall that this variable help us to understand whether the sensitivity of 
consumption to income changes with the policy and the scenario we consider, and how the 
IS curve shifts in response to the expenditure increase. The response of the consumption to 
output ratio is qualitatively similar across countries: it instantaneously falls and returns to 
its steady state quite slowly. However, the magnitude of the changes is considerably larger 
in the EA than in the other countries – consumption is crowded out more in the EA. Thus, 
following government expenditure shocks that are expected to be reversed in the near 
future, consumers act more neoclassical and less Keynesian, in the sense that the sensitivity 
of consumption to current income falls. In this scenario, the dynamics of the real interest 
rate may be more important for consumption expenditures than on average. Since the real 
rate falls in the EA and increases in the US and the UK, the EA multiplier is almost three 
times as large as in the other two countries. 
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The consolidation scenario presents similar features. Unexpected increases in government 
consumption expenditure which are known to bring deficit reductions in the future increase 
the real wage and make the labor efficiency wedge fall, while the real rate responds 
positively in the US and UK and negatively in the EA, although the effect in the EA is quite 
temporary. The magnitude of the per-capita output multiplier in the two scenarios is 
roughly similar in the US; it is slightly larger in the consolidation scenario in the EA, 
primarily because the responses of the real wage and the efficiency wedge are larger; and it 
is larger in the UK in the consolidation scenario. Given that the dynamics of inflation and 
of long term inflation expectations are similar in the two programs, differences in the 
magnitude of UK per-capita multiplier must be due to the fact that in the consolidation 
scenario the behavior of consumers is different. The last column of figure 6 shows that, 
indeed, the private consumption to output ratio strongly increases in this scenario (it fell in 
the reversal scenario, see figure 5). Thus, consumer spending becomes more Keynesian and 
this may explain why the output boost is larger with this consolidation program. 
 
What have we learned from these two exercises? Neither the pessimistic view about debt 
consolidation programs contained in Uhlig (2010), nor the optimistic view about spending 
reversals of Corsetti et al. (2009), are fully supported in the data. There is some evidence 
that well designed and well understood reversible expansionary expenditure schemes could 
lead to output expansions that are larger than those obtained with an expansionary 
expenditure scheme which is not expected to be reversed in the future. However, for this to 
be the case one of two conditions need to be satisfied. A consolidation program which is 
accompanied by a fall in the real rate of interest has more chances to be output effective in 
the short run. Similarly, given a real rate response, a consolidation program which induces 
a more Keynesian consumption expenditure pattern may deliver larger output multipliers. 
Thus, regardless of the debt containment scheme, the short run effectiveness of the fiscal 
expansions crucially depends on what monetary policy does and what agents perceive the 
future will bring them in terms of output and inflation.  In general, rather than the details of 
the scheme, it is the credibility of the program and the monetary policy stance that 
determine how successful the expansion will be. 
 
  
                                                    5. Conclusions 
 
What conclusions can one draw from our study? First, the class of sticky price New 
Keynesian models now used as benchmark for policy analysis provides, in normal times, 
useful guidance to understand the mechanisms leading to effective fiscal expansions in all 
countries. The three conditions the theory has singled out as necessary to deliver large 
output effects have different importance in practice: how monetary policy responds to the 
fiscal expansions is crucial in determining the magnitude of per-capita output multipliers, 
while the sensitivity of real wages to demand conditions appears to be minor. Cross country 
differences in the magnitude of per-capita output multipliers are important and can be 
related to two main factors: the cyclicality of the markup and trade openness. Other things 
being equal, the more open is a country and the less reactive is the markup to cyclical 
conditions, the smaller is the per-capita output multiplier that a given expenditure 
expansion generates. Other factors, such as the “size” of the government sector or the 30 
 
extent of labor market regulations seem to be much less important in accounting for the 
cross country differences in the magnitude of per-capita output multipliers we report. 
 
Second, per-capita output multipliers generated in situations like those prevailing in 2009-
2010 are unlikely to be larger than those obtained on average in the past. There are two 
reasons for why our results differ from those presented in the literature. The first one is that, 
historically, in the scenarios we consider the ceteris paribus assumptions theory employs 
are unlikely to be satisfied, making the conditions for effectiveness of fiscal expansions 
either not satisfied or less sufficient.  In particular, we find that expectations may be 
substantially affected and that parameters which are typically regarded as structural may 
instead be state dependent. Thus, a more complex model needs to be used to fully 
understand the implications of fiscal expansions in situations of deep economic crises. The 
second reason is that the scenarios we consider may have a hard time to capture the fact 
that, right now, the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero, simply because the probability that 
this happened in the past is essentially negligible. If this is the case, care should be 
exercised when using the implications of our analysis to predict the effects of current 
expenditure expansions. However, while per-capita output multipliers are unlikely to be 
large, there are important differences in the ability of fiscal policy to affect output in 
different countries and in different conditions. Explaining these heterogeneities requires a 
detailed analysis of the structural difference the three economies display in these scenarios, 
an analysis which is beyond the scope of this paper.  In general, the cross country 
differences we detect indicate that while the predictions of the class of models are generally 
valid, one should be careful in using them when special conditions are in place, not only 
because the conditions are outside of the norm, but also because different countries may be 
reacting differently to the same fiscal impulse. 
  
Third, the debt consequences of the expenditure programs we have considered are quite 
small. Thus, neither the fact that the current packages are large as percentage of output nor 
the fact that output growth is currently low appear to threaten fiscal sustainability in any of 
the three countries we examine. Our calculations are conditional on future expectations 
being roughly constant, but even if shifts in expectations consistent with the dynamics of 
government bond yields we obtain are considered, debt effects appear to be limited. To 
justify the pressures in the bond markets which appeared in 2010, expectations need to shift 
considerably more than in the past in response to the current expenditure expansion. 
However, to analyze the consequences of fiscal policy actions when considerable swings in 
the future perceptions of the state of the economy are possible may require an alternative 
theoretical framework where expectations may not necessarily be rational. Studying the 
implications of spending shocks using these alternative frameworks is clearly interesting, 
but beyond the scope of the current paper. 
 
Fourth, the expenditure increases contemplated for 2009 and 2010 are unlikely to lead to 
significant and persistent increases in inflation. Thus, it is highly improbable that fiscal 
policy will help to liberate monetary policy from the zero nominal interest rate trap. 
However, since changes in fiscal policy may have state dependent effects on the private 
sector, other channels the analysis has not considered may affect the conclusions we reach.  
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schemes may lead to short run output expansions that are larger than those obtained with 
expenditure expansions which are not expected to be corrected in the future. For this to 
occur, however, monetary policy needs to be accommodative and the policy credible, in the 
sense that future inflation expectations are under control. When monetary policy is 
restrictive, consolidation policies which make consumers care more about current and less 
about future income have the potential to produce large short run output expansions. The 
details of the consolidation scheme as well as its timing appear to be much less crucial in 
determining the quality of the outcome. What appears to be important is that the policy is 
well understood and the commitment to return to the fiscal orthodoxy solid. All in all, the 
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy and the expectations effects appears to be a 
crucial ingredient to understand the output effects of expenditure expansions and of 
consolidation schemes.  
   
We are well aware of the limitations of our analysis and we would like to spell out some of 
them in details. While the results we obtain lead to a consistent pattern of conclusions, one 
should mention that our analysis completely disregards open economy considerations. 
While a closed economy point of view may not be a huge problem for the US and EA, it 
may be more relevant for the UK and twin deficits dynamics (see Corsetti and Muller 
(2006)) may result. In addition, the analysis of the paper concentrates entirely on 
government consumption expenditure disturbances and does not analyze expansions that 
occur, for example, because of increases in transfers or reductions in the social security 
contributions of firms and employees. While our focus on the current situation justifies our 
choice, one should be aware that they may be government programs that are more 
expansionary in terms of output than government consumption expenditure increases. 
Similarly, it is important to recognize that policies reducing the size of the government 
sector (i.e. combination of tax and expenditure cuts) could have important expansionary 
effects, while leaving the deficit unchanged.  The paper has also sidestepped the issue of 
fiscal predictability. Because fiscal policy decisions are typically taken in a parliament, 
legislation and implementation lags may make fiscal changes forecastable. That is, agents 
may react to the announcement of the fiscal change, anticipating the effect of the 
expenditure expansion and, conversely, the economy may not display any visible change at 
the time when the actual expenditure takes place.  Leeper at al. (2009), Ramey (2009), 
Mertens and Ravn (2008) and Forni and Gambetti (2010) indicated that such a problem could 
be important and inference distorted if predictability is not taken into account. An earlier 
version of this paper compared the dynamics induced by unpredictable and predictable shocks 
and did indeed find differences in the pattern of responses. However, since the general 
conclusions are maintained even when shocks are predictable, we prefer to defer the discussion 
of predictability issues to a related work (Canova and Pappa, 2011). Finally, we would like to 
remind the reader that our empirical framework allows us to consider only certain types of 
consumption expenditure disturbances. Other interesting shocks, for example, fiscal 
disturbances which occur in combination with financial disturbances and which may 
generate important non-linear effects, need to be analyzed with more complicated nonlinear 






Appendix A: A prototypical New Keynesian model 
 
The model we present in this appendix is a simplified version of the one considered in 
Pappa (2009) and can be used to illustrate the typical predictions of New Keynesian models 
regarding the instantaneous effects of deficit financed government expenditure shocks on 
consumption, hours, the real wage and output. 
 
The economy is populated by a representative consumer whose preferences are represented 





where Ct is private consumption, Nt  is hours worked, σ>0 is the constant relative risk 
aversion coefficient, φ>0 is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity, 0<β<1 is the 
discount factor and χ>0 is a constant. Here Eo represents the expectation operator, 
conditional on the information available at time zero. 
 
Consumers earn income by renting capital and labour services to firms and by holding one 
period government bonds and shares in the firms. The government collects taxes via a 
distorting income tax which is levied on labour and capital income and via lump sum taxes. 
Consumers maximize their lifetime utility choosing sequences for private consumption, 
investment, hours worked, and bond holdings, taking as given prices and tax rates, subject 









where Pt is the price level, It is investment, Bt are one period nominal bonds, Rt is the 
nominal interest rate, wt is the real wage, rt the rental rate of capital, Tt are lump sum 
transfers and Ξt are profits from owing the intermediate goods firms; τ is the income tax 
rate, δ is the depreciation rate of capital and ν controls the costs of adjusting capital which 
are assumed to be quadratic. 
 
In the production sector, there is a competitive firm assembling intermediate goods into a 
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where ε > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for intermediate goods, Yt is final output 
and Yt (j) is the output of intermediate good j. The final good can be used for private and 
government consumption and investment, i.e. 
  
t t t t G I C Y + + =  
 
There is a continuum of firms producing intermediate goods. Each intermediate firm j 
produces output according to the constant return to scale technology: 
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where Ajt is a technological disturbance and α the share of capital in production.  These 
firms are perfectly competitive in the input markets and minimize costs by choosing private 
inputs, taking wages and the rental rate of capital as given. Since firms are identical, they 























Thus, the common real marginal costs are given by: 
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In the output market intermediate goods are monopolistic competitors. The strategy firms 
use to set prices depends on whether prices are flexible or sticky. In the latter case the 
probability for an intermediate good producer to reset her price is set equal to (1-γ). When a 
producer receives a signal to change her price, she chooses a new price to maximize 
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where Qt,t+j is the shareholder’s discount factor (the marginal utility for consumers of one 
unit of nominal profits t+j periods from now) and the aggregate price index evolves 
according to: 
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When prices are flexible the fraction of firms that can reset their price at each t is equal to 
one (γ=0) and prices are set as a constant mark-up over marginal costs 









Government's income consists of tax receipts and the proceeds from new debt issue; 
expenditures consist of consumption purchases and repayment of debt. The government 
budget constraint is: 
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There is an independent monetary authority which sets the nominal interest rate as a 
function of current inflation, according to the rule: 
 
R
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where   π ζ  a feedback parameter. To close the model one has several options. The first one 
is to assume a balance budget in each period (i.e. Bt =0 for all t), absence of distorting 
taxation (τ=0) . Alternatively, one could balance the budget using distorting tax revenues 
and let Tt=0 for all t. If debt is allowed, one has the option of letting the debt grow without 
limits or use a debt targeting rule of the form: 
 
  )) ( exp( B B T T t b t − = ζ  
 
where T is a constant, B is some target level of debt and  b ζ  a feedback parameter. In case 
lump sum taxes cannot be used to limit the growth of debt and only distorting taxes are 
available, the rule becomes 
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where now distorting tax rates are time varying. 
 
Pappa (2009) has shown that expansionary shocks to government consumption expenditure 
which are financed with bond creation induce robust impact responses for Gt (it increases), 
the deficit Gt- Tt (it increases), and output growth Δ Y t (it increases) when the parameters  
(σ, χ, φ, υ, δ, ε, α,  γ,  π ζ ,   b ζ ) of the model are allowed to vary within a reasonable range. 
 
To show the implications of the model for the variables of interest and to show what are the 
differences between the New Keynesian and the neoclassical version of the model we 
assume that (β=0.99, σ=1, χ=1, φ=2, υ=2, δ=0.25, ε=7, α=0.3,   π ζ =1.5,   b ζ =0.2, τ=0) and 
simulate the responses of consumption, investment, real wage, the real rate, hours and 
output when an impulse in government expenditure shock lasting one period in the log-
linearized solution of the model. Figure A1 reports in the top panel the responses when 
γ=0.75 and in the bottom panel the responses when γ=0. 35 
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Figure A1: Responses to a government consumption spending shock. Top panel New 








     Appendix B: Data Construction 
 
US:  
1) Ratio of consumption expenditure to GDP: nominal consumption expenditure (BEA 
A955RC1) divided by real GDP (BEA A191RX1) times GDP deflator (BEA B191RG3). 
2) Ratio of total tax receipts to GDP: total nominal receipts (BEA W066RC1) divided by 
real GDP (BEA A191RX1) times GDP deflator (BEA B191RG3).  
3) Growth rate of real GDP per-capita: First difference of the log of real GDP (BEA 
A191RX1) divided by working age population 16 to 65 (FRED POP16OV), annualized. 
4) Growth rate of real wages: first difference of the log of Nonfarm Business Sector 
Nominal Compensation per Hour (BLS COMPNFB) divided by the GDP deflator (BEA 
B191RG3), annualized in percentages. 
5) Real interest rate: nominal 3-Month Treasury bill: Secondary Market Rate (FRED 
TB3MS) minus the annualized first difference of the log of GDP deflator (BEA B191RG3). 
6) Profit rate: one minus the product of total non-farm employment rate (FRED 
CES0000000001) times Nonfarm Business Sector Nominal Compensation per Hour (BLS 
COMPNFB) divided by nominal GDP (BEA A191RC1) 
7) Inflation rate: first difference of the log of GDP deflator (BEA B191RG3), annualized. 
8) Long term yields: average yield on 10 year bonds (IMS) 
9) Ratio of private consumption expenditure to GDP: real personal consumption 
expenditure (FRED PCECC96) to real GDP (FRED GDPC96), three digit, chained dollars. 
 
EU (1)-7) and 9) from the AW9 database). 
1) Ratio of consumption expenditure to GDP: nominal government consumption 
expenditure to nominal GDP. 
2) Ratio of total tax receipts to GDP: total nominal government revenues to nominal GDP. 
3) Growth rate of real GDP per-capita: First difference of the log of real GDP, scaled by the 
labor force, annualized.  
4) Growth rate of real wages: first difference of the log of the nominal wage per head 
scaled by the GDP deflator, annualized. 
5) Real interest rate: nominal short term interest rate minus the annualized first difference 
of the log of GDP deflator 
6) Profit rate: one minus the product of nominal wage per head and number of persons 
employed, scaled by nominal GDP. 
7) Inflation rate: first difference of the log of GDP deflator annualized. 
8) Long term yields: average yield on 10 year bonds (IFS) 
9) Total real private consumption expenditure divided by real GDP 
 
UK  
1) Ratio of consumption expenditure to GDP: nominal seasonally adjusted consumption 
expenditure (from the IFS) divided by nominal seasonally adjusted GDP (from the IFS).  
2) Ratio of total tax receipts to GDP: sum of seasonally adjusted direct and indirect taxes 
(from the OECD) divided by nominal GDP (from the IFS). 
3) Growth rate of real GDP per-capita: First difference of the log of nominal GDP (from the 
IFS) divided by the GDP deflator and total population (both from IFS), annualized.  37 
 
4) Growth rate of real wages: first difference of the log of nominal employee compensation 
(AR) CURA (from the OECD) divided by the seasonally adjusted GDP deflator (from the 
IFS), annualized. 
5) Real interest rate: nominal 3-Month Treasury bill rate (from the IFS) minus the first 
annualized difference of the log of GDP deflator (from the IFS). 
6) Profit rate: one minus the product of real UK employee compensation (AR) CURA 
(from the OECD) and number of persons employed (from IFS) scaled by real GDP (from 
IFS). 
7) Inflation rate: first difference of the log of GDP deflator (from IFS) annualized. 
8) Long term yields: average yield on 10 year bonds (from IFS) 
9) Ratio of consumption to GDP: Real private consumption expenditure to real GDP (both 
from IFS). 
 
Acronyms: BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and product Accounts; 
BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics, FRED: Fed of St. Louis, IFS: International Finance 
Statistics, OECD: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
 
 
    Appendix C: The Bayesian prior and the algorithm to identify shocks. 
 
The Bayesian prior we use assumes that the VAR coefficients are random and that the 
covariance matrix of the shocks is fixed. Letting A denote the vectorized version of the 
coefficients of the VAR, we assume that A is normally distributed with mean M and 
covariance S. Furthermore, we assume that M is vector of zeros except for the first own lag 
of the variables entering in logs in the VAR (i.e. G/Y, T/Y, R, Profit, Inflation). The 
covariance matrix S depends on four hyperparameters: s(1) regulates the general tightness 
of the prior; s(2) regulates the importance of lags of other variables in one equation; s(3) 
regulates the tightness of the constant term; s(4) regulates the lag decay of the prior. 
Values for the hyperparameters are obtained using a simple grid search and maximizing the 
in-sample predictive power of the model over the training sample preceding the estimation 
sample and the interpretability of the results for each country. For the US s=[0.0005, 0.5, 
0.1,2], for the EU and the UK s=[0.0001, 0.1, 0.1,2]. Given the OLS estimates of A, 
posterior estimates are obtained combining sample and prior information using a Theil-
mixed type estimator – see Canova (2007) for details. Denote the posterior distribution of 
A, by P(A). Such a distribution is normal with mean and variance which weight sample and 
prior information with weights given by the relative precision of the two types of 
information. Given P(A), we draw vectors A(1),….A(m) using Monte Carlo methods. 
  
Government expenditure shocks are identified using the following approach. Let HH’=I, 
and let Q(j, k) be the impulse response matrix at horizon j produced by some orthogonal 
decomposition of S and the draw k from the posterior distribution of the coefficient vector 
and  let Q(1,j,k) the response vector for the k-th draw produced at horizon j by the first 
orthogonal shock. We compute  R(j,k)=Q(j,k)H and check whether the signs of the 
elements of R(1,j,k) for the appropriate variables are correct. If they are, R(1, j, k) is stored, 
if they are not the resulting impulse responses are tossed. To generate H, we draw n times n 
random normal matrices with zero mean and unit variance, perform a QR decomposition 
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